Agents with Consciousness

Independent of the details of a consciousness we assume that the consciousness is some subset of the brain (see above 2.3). Looking to consciousness not from an implementation point of view but from the point of view of it's functionality we assume it as a distinguished system having an interface to the 'rest' of the cognitive machinery, saying that an agent has input $\Sigma^{*}$ and output $\Xi^{*}$ values, a consciousness $C$ as well some more internal states called non-conscious states $NC$, and a system function $\gamma$.

$$A(x) iff \langle \Sigma^{*}, \Xi^{*}, C, NC, \gamma\rangle$$ (6.9)

While the system function $\gamma$ maps the input $\Sigma^{*}$ onto the output $\Xi^{*}$ using the non-conscious part $NC$, we assume that the consciousness $C$ communicates only with the non-consciousness $NC$ by the special mapping $ncc$.

$$\gamma : \Sigma^{*} \times NC \longmapsto \Xi^{*}$$ (6.10)

$$ncc : NC \rightleftarrows C$$ (6.11)

The consciousness $C$ has itself a structure which basically can be described as a set of phenomena [$Ph$] and a knowledge, that this is the case^6.1. This 'knowledge' do we reconstruct here as a function [$cog$], mapping phenomena into phenomena whereby the phenomena $Ph$ are given as 'perceived' [$\pi$], as 'remembered' [$\rho$], as 'imagined'[$\iota$] etc. These additional attributes qualify a mode [$MODE$] of thinking.

$$cog : 2^{Ph \times MODE} \longmapsto 2^{Ph^{*}}$$ (6.12)

$$\{\pi, \rho, \iota\} \subseteq MODE$$ (6.13)

$$Ph^{*} \subseteq Ph$$ (6.14)

$$Ph \neq \emptyset$$ (6.15)

Finally it should be possible to describe any kind of known knowledge phenomenon within this model. At the moment of this writing the necessary analyses have not yet been done completely. They have to be extended in the future if needed. Three special cases will be mentioned especially: object, abstraction, relation, and signification.